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讚揚六四屠殺後,Trump 又稱香港民主運動為「騷亂」(riots)

《香港人權及民主法案》在參議院受阻,或將延期、減辣

https://hk.appledaily.com/local/ ... CWRO3RMNKZHFNWVQAQ/

「國際牌」是香港反修例運動的重要抗爭手段,已獲美國眾議院全票通過的《香港人權及民主法案》,卻尚未獲參議院排期優先審議,令有關能夠制裁香港特區官員的「武器」未必及時上場。據《蘋果》了解,不少參議員對法案有所保留,包括掌握議程調動權力的多數黨領袖麥康奈爾都反對有關制裁機制。消息指,法案在制裁機制上或作調整,收窄針對對象至部份中國企業、直接打壓香港的中央及特區政府高級官員,並會延至明年春季才表決。

截至上月31日,《香港人權及民主法案》已獲36名參議員聯署支持,但仍未獲麥康奈爾調動議程優先審批。據悉,目前多於五名參議員對法案有所保留,家族向來親北京、至今未就法案表態的麥康奈爾等部份議員不贊成採取制裁措施;而被指親中的加州民主黨范士丹等議員則關注法案或影響與中國關係;另有議員擔心落實制裁機制會影響香港的特殊地位,對港造成永久傷害。

有消息指,參議院不會採納眾議院通過的版本,提出法案的參議員魯比奧辦公室正着手調整法案的制裁內容,使制裁對像更具針對性,避免直接影響香港享有的特殊地位;另有消息指制裁將收窄至部份中國企業、京、港直接打壓香港的官員,或未能觸及港人原希望一網打盡的選舉主任或濫暴警員。消息人士指,行政機關從未正面批評警暴問題,足見端倪。

有熟悉美國國會人士估計明年春季才有機會表決法案,相信屆時仍會獲大比數支持,並指美方希望以持久戰方式維持香港運作,以及保障在港人民安全,如非必要都不希望實施制裁,但認為香港人應鞏固美國國會對香港的持續支持。

香港眾志駐華盛頓常委敖卓軒接受查詢時指,若有議員反對法案,可以阻止法案以「一致通過(Unanimous Consent)」方式審批,加以拖延,若有多於一人,更可輪流無間斷地提出有關要求而毋須表露身份。他認為,針對性作出制裁改動是好事,讓行政機關日後執行法案當中可行機制時有更多選項,同時避免衝擊香港獨立關稅區地位。

早前曾經訪美的香港眾志秘書長黃之鋒承認《香港人權及民主法案》於參議院面對頗大阻滯,但強調眾志及其他民主派會繼續推動麥康奈爾將法案調動至較前審議位置,呼籲港人繼續爭取國際社會關注,及以不同途徑向參議員作出支持法案的清晰表態。

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【路透社】《香港人權與民主法案》在參議院受阻,已知有九名參議員反對該法案;川普表態:若貿易談判有進展,他將對香港問題沉默

https://www.reuters.com/article/ ... acles-idUSKBN1XF2GW

Effort in U.S. Congress to rein in China on Hong Kong protests faces obstacles

November 6, 2019

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A push in the U.S. Congress for legislation to support pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong and pressure China to refrain from a violent crackdown faces an array of obstacles, raising questions about the prospect it will ever become law.

The fate of the legislation could depend in part on whether lawmakers who represent states with companies heavily invested in the Chinese market can overcome concerns about Beijing’s retaliation against U.S. businesses.

The outlook is further clouded by a cautious response on Hong Kong by the Trump administration at a crucial juncture for U.S.-China trade talks and uncertainty over whether congressional leaders will make the issue a priority on a crowded end-of-year agenda.

The House of Representatives unanimously passed Hong Kong human rights legislation in mid-October, including a bill that would place Hong Kong’s special treatment by the United States under tighter scrutiny, drawing accusations from Beijing that the lawmakers had “sinister intentions.”

A Senate committee approved a similar measure in September, but it has not been scheduled for a vote by the full body, which is required before legislation can be sent to President Donald Trump. The White House has yet to say whether he would sign or veto it.

Even as Hong Kong activists have set their hearts on stronger U.S. action, which they see as vital to a movement that has drawn millions to the streets, the issue remains largely up in the air in Washington.

The bill’s delay - against a backdrop of increasingly dangerous clashes between protesters and police - has been a source of frustration for lawmakers whose overwhelming support for the legislation cuts across party lines.

“Your guess is as good as mine as to why something that enjoys that broad, bipartisan support - and on an issue that’s acute and happening now - has not reached the floor of the U.S. Senate,” Republican Senator Marco Rubio, a leading China hawk and the bill’s chief co-sponsor, told Reuters.

TRUMP GOES SILENT ON HONG KONG

Looming over the Hong Kong crisis is the bitter trade war between the world’s two biggest economies. Trump has said he and Chinese President Xi Jinping will soon sign a “Phase One” trade deal, his administration’s top priority with Beijing.

At an Oct. 11 meeting in the Oval Office, Trump told Chinese Vice Premier Liu He he would keep quiet on the Hong Kong protests as long as progress was being made on trade, according to two people briefed on the discussions.

The White House did not respond to a question on whether Trump made such a promise or if the administration was concerned the Hong Kong situation could complicate trade talks.

While Trump has since avoided publicly criticizing China over Hong Kong, Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have spoken out against Beijing’s human rights record in Hong Kong and elsewhere, including its treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.

The legislation reflects an increasingly hard-line sentiment among some of Trump’s fellow Republicans and many Democrats over what they see as Beijing’s tightening grip on Hong Kong.

Protesters are campaigning against what they see as Chinese meddling with the freedoms promised under the “one country-two systems” formula when Britain returned Hong Kong to Chinese rule in 1997. China denies doing so, and has blamed Western countries for stirring up trouble.

The U.S. bills would amend existing law to require annual certification from the State Department that Hong Kong remains sufficiently autonomous from Beijing to justify the unique treatment by Washington that has helped it to develop into a major financial center.

China has threatened unspecified countermeasures, prompting the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong to warn of “counterproductive consequences” of the legislation that could hurt U.S. businesses.

That has given rise to speculation that some senators, especially those in agricultural states or with major China-dependent businesses, would prefer a go-slow approach and might even work behind the scenes to block the legislation.

Mark Simon, a Hong Kong-based executive for Next Media, a media group funded by pro-democracy businessman Jimmy Lai, is pessimistic about the Senate bill’s near-term prospects after a recent round of meetings with members of Congress in Washington.

Simon expressed concern that as many as nine senators might have objections to the bill – though none has said so publicly. “The U.S. Senate, by refusing to stand up for Hong Kong, is editing our political process in order to sell some grain, pork, and planes,” he told Reuters.

Rubio said he had not heard objections from fellow senators, but noted it could be “somehow wrapped up in the broader trade issues and fear that it could unravel that.”

‘FOREIGN BLACK HAND’

Despite activists’ clamoring for U.S. action, some experts say it could be counterproductive.

Steve Tsang, director of the China Institute at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, said the legislation “would play into Beijing’s hands by claiming it as evidence of the existence of a ‘foreign black hand’ behind the protests in Hong Kong.”

Bills similar to the current legislation have been introduced and gone nowhere in the past three Congresses, but the protracted crisis in Hong Kong has helped the measures advance further than previously.

The White House did not respond to requests for comment. But a U.S. official speaking on condition of anonymity said the administration was prepared to let the congressional process run its course.

It is unclear whether Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell will set a vote on a bill during an already jammed schedule in the final weeks of the 2019 session, including the threat of a federal government shutdown and looming impeachment proceedings against Trump.

One way to get around those obstacles, congressional aides say, would be to attach the Hong Kong legislation to a broader Senate bill on defense or the budget.

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炮轟特朗普為利益背棄港人 《華郵》評論促參院盡快表決

https://hk.news.appledaily.com/i ... e/20191110/60247301

美國參議院遲遲未表決《香港人權與民主法案》,美國輿論也炮轟白宮及參院多數黨領袖麥康奈爾為中美貿易談判營造良好氣氛,刻意拖延表決。美國專門研究國家安全及外交政策的評論員羅金(Josh Rogin)在《華盛頓郵報》撰文,炮轟總統特朗普及麥康奈爾為利益,讓香港人失望,他形容雖然香港人無論有沒有美國支持也會抗爭下去,但美國此時「背棄香港人」,實際是放棄自己的道德和戰略影響力。

羅金在《華盛頓郵報》發表題為《特朗普與麥康奈爾正讓港人失望》(Trump and McConnell are failing the people of Hong Kong),他形容自數以百萬人上街示威至今5個月,美國眾議院已一致通過《香港人權與民主法案》,以監察香港的自治情況以及制裁損害自治的官員,而香港人也不斷爭取國際支持,尤其要爭取美國國會通過此法案,他在文中引述參議院少數派領袖舒默(Charles Schumer)說:「我們需要向主席(習近平)發出清晰訊息,表明美國在香港人行使民主權利之時,會與他們肩並肩。任何人聲稱支持香港人的,都應該跟我們一起促請參議院推動《香港人權與民主法案》。」

但羅金形容,目前仍未有迹象顯示參議院即將安排全院表決,他認為必須歸咎兩個人——總統特朗普及參議院多數黨領袖麥康奈爾。他指出,參議院有消息指,麥康奈爾受到白宮壓力,因為白宮不希望如今在貿易談判首階段尾聲之時,「令北京不悅」或節外生枝,文章更重提早有報道揭發,六月特朗普曾與習近平通電話,承諾在貿易談判期間會在香港問題上沉默,而路透社早前也有報道指,特朗普在10月11日會見中國特使劉鶴時,也重申此立場

羅金坦言,特朗普對香港問題的取態一直非常清晰,早在8月他已與北京措辭一致,形容示威是「騷亂」,更曾說過美國不會介入。但麥康奈爾不同,他在8月時曾在《華爾街日報》以《我們站在香港一方》為題撰文,揚言會支持《香港人權與民主法案》,當時麥康奈爾更寫道:「最重要的是要認識到,導致這場危機的力量並非始於香港,也不會在那兒結束;這亂局是北京有計劃地提高其國內壓迫和追求外國霸權的結果。」

「他說得對,可惜現在他沉默了。」羅金這樣評價麥康奈爾的說法,他在文中承認,美國商界取態是關鍵,他說:「美國商界對立法有憂慮,若然美國撤銷香港的特別經濟地位,那麼美國公司會受到影響。」但他解釋,法案影響還沒有那麼深遠,因為還要政府寫報告,評估香港的高度自治是否值得維持這地位,才會向那些損害法治的相關官員實施制裁甚至撤銷地位。

羅金承認,中國政府勢必會威脅美國若不就人權問題「閉口」,就會破壞貿易協議,但他認為若然美國真的像特朗普般就範,將兩個問題扯上關係,只會削弱美國在這兩個議題的立場。參院外交委員會民主黨籍首席議員梅南德茲(Robert Menendez)曾跟羅金說:「我真的很擔心特朗普政府再一次打算出賣香港人及他們合法的民主願望。」

羅金批評,特朗普為了連任戰考慮,急切想與中國達成協議,甚至不惜只求「壞協議」,但他向麥康奈爾痛陳是非,認為他可盡快安排表決,讓《香港人權與民主法案》在兩黨一致支持下通過,就正如麥康奈爾自己也說過,這不只關乎香港的事,這是關乎中國共產黨野心擴張時,美國所擔當的抵禦角色。他在結語說:「香港人會為自己的權利而戰,無論有沒有美國的支持。但若然我們放棄他們,我們將犧牲對北京的實際道德和戰略影響力——為的是大豆銷售。特朗普看來不介意,所以國會必須行動。」

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美國呼吁共匪與民眾雙方都放棄暴力

在共匪鎮壓和屠殺民眾時,西方總是呼吁共匪與民眾雙方都放棄暴力。

結果往往是,民眾聽話,放棄暴力了;但共匪根本不聽,繼續變本加厲使用暴力。

於是,本來已是弱勢一方的民眾,徹底放棄抵抗,任由共匪屠殺;共匪更加肆無忌憚屠殺民眾,西方對此最多是發聲譴責,而沒有任何實際行動。

西藏的情況就是這樣。

西藏長期遭受共匪的殘酷鎮壓和屠殺,多年前曾有藏人想要武裝反抗共匪,但西方政要對藏人說:你們一定要堅持和平非暴力,如果你們使用暴力,我們就不再支持你們了。

於是,藏人繼續任由共匪屠殺,繼續被屠殺了很多年。

西方的支持呢?十幾年前還有一些口頭上的支持,現在乾脆連口頭支持都沒有了,西方政要會見共匪頭子時,都避談西藏問題了。川普一上任,更要立即砍掉對流亡藏人的支持。

8964 的情況也類似。共匪大屠殺民眾之後,西方短暫制裁了一下,然後很快撤銷制裁,並幫助共匪經濟起飛;西方政商界更與共匪紅色權貴勾結,一起吸取匪區奴民們的血汗骨髓。

再說,即使通過了人權法案,就能有效制止共匪施暴嗎?恐怕也未必。

因為人權法案需要白宮去使用,而一到要精準打擊共匪權貴時,川普一定會放水的,已有大量先例證明。

西藏和新疆的人權法案早通過了,川普使用了嗎?

即使換上一個真反共的、真正會使用人權法案的總統,在實施制裁之前,還要先搜證、擬定名單等,這是需要一段時間的,而在這段時間裏,不知又有多少民眾被共匪打殺、輪姦、暗殺了。

況且,共匪犯下的是殺人、強姦、群體滅絕等罪行,僅僅對共匪官員經濟制裁、禁止他們入境,足夠嗎?

簡而言之,人權法案是遠水救不了近火,民眾即时的自救、自保,衹能靠自己。

而一旦連正當防衛的權利都被剝奪,那民眾衹能任由共匪單邊屠殺了。

要明白一點:並不是民眾非暴力,共匪就會停止暴力,共匪一向是主動對和平民眾使用暴力。

那民眾不抵抗,逃跑總可以吧?很不幸,共匪早就部署好封路、封車站,大圍捕、大搜捕、大濫捕,還有人臉識別、跟蹤暗殺等,民眾逃也很難逃脫。

即使民眾躲在家裏、躲在學校裏,匪警也會沖入民居、學校,大肆施暴、大肆濫捕。

其實,當前港人對警暴的反應,是相當軟弱的。

例如眼睜睜看著幾個警察暴打一名市民至重傷瀕死,周圍大量群眾衹是圍觀、拍攝、譴責,而不敢出手救人。

大量根本不是示威、衹是路過的無關市民,被警察濫捕、暴打,周圍大量群眾也衹是圍觀、拍攝、譴責,不敢出手救人。

根本不是示威,衹是在街上行走,被警察看中的少女,被濫捕、栽贓、塞入警車或私家車,然後下落不明,大量群眾也衹是圍觀、拍攝、譴責、記下車牌,不敢出手救人。

拒絕向反人民的政府交稅、拒絕向殺民黑警發工資,港人也一直不敢做。

如果對如此軟弱的群眾,還要他們徹底放棄抵抗、任由共匪單邊暴力,那將會出現怎樣的人道災難?

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【RFI】特朗普,北京最好的候選人?

http://www.rfi.fr/cn/20191112-%E ... 9%E9%80%89%E4%BA%BA

法國『世界報』發表題為『特朗普,北京最好的候選人』的專欄文章,作者試圖描述這樣一幅前景:透過表面的美中貿易大戰,中方事實上暗暗期待特朗普再次當選成功。為什麼?因為….

文章說,智利大混亂,被迫取消了原定於11月中旬在該國舉行的亞太經合峰會,這至少有一點是可取的,美國總統特朗普與中國國家主席習近平把簽署貿易協議的時間往後推延。這一事件給雙方的談判者帶來了喘息的機會,可使他們從容選擇一個具有象徵性的地方簽署協議。特朗普希望在美國愛荷華簽,這是一個被中方以不購買大豆做武器反擊美國海關稅而遭受慘重損失的農業州。這對習近平來說恰好,他曾在愛荷華的農場裏度過一段時間,說不定樂於重返舊地。

不過,北京為什麼要給正在全力競選的特朗普獻上一份政治大禮呢?很簡單,因為特朗普再次當選中國人有利可圖。也許人們覺得這很難懂,一個對中國不停加稅的美國總統,他攻擊中國的明星產業 華為,他向一些中國高官發出簽證限制……然而,根據『外交政治』期刊,從北京傳出的消息顯示, 「特朗普是北京最好的王牌,中國領導人希望特朗普再次當選,因為他太虛弱了。」

當然嘍,特朗普是北京一個珍貴的王牌,衹要他能讓美國繼續削弱奧巴馬先前達成了旨在鉗制中國的泛亞太地區自貿協議,特朗普上臺之日予以廢除。從庫爾德地區到菲律賓,現在沒有多少人信任華盛頓。而此刻,華盛頓幾乎陷入一場內戰,這當然讓北京高興。

重返白宮的民主黨會使得兩大超級強權獲得一種建設性的共治嗎?好像不是。美國的反中共識非常強大,而美國不可能忍受落在第二位。民主黨,首先是他們候選人中的最左翼:桑德爾和伊麗莎白.沃倫,他們有一個抵觸自由貿易主義的計劃,他們更注重的是人權。總而言之,比起特朗普主義到處撒播的混沌,美國在民主黨領導下重新變得一致而且苛求,這會使得習近平非常尷尬。特朗普與習近平打貿易戰,我們將會看到一個最終的貿易協議,表面上會有許多讓步,實際上,重回原點

一些人漸漸發覺了問題,尤其是墨西哥總統洛佩斯,在與美國達成一個不真實的自貿協議後,他以為輕鬆地度過了一段蜜月。然後,墨西哥同意堵住中美洲移民進入美國之路。所有人都是特朗普主義嗎?威權政體頭目肯定毫無疑問,他們發覺特朗普冒充摔角選手的一面。普京至此非常高興,他在精心地佈置棋盤;而從馬克龍開始,歐盟與俄羅斯的關係正在變得緩和。

其實,特朗普主義的真正大輸家是德國人。他們還生活在過去的時代,那個美國人負責他們的安全,保證大西洋兩岸自由貿易的時代,美德之間的互不信任將隨著特朗普進一步擴大針對德國汽車的戰爭而擴大,民粹主義要求任何時候必須得有一個敵人作對。默克爾,冷戰的女兒,還在夢想著那個再也不會重新回來的時代,即使與民主黨人也已變味,在奧巴馬推出重返亞洲戰略之後,過去的那個時代開始結束。

令人好奇的是,法國還自以為可以繼續在特朗普主義的浪花上沖浪,法國已經非工業化,因此不太會遭受特朗普海關稅的威脅,而且酩悅·軒尼詩-路易·威登集團大老闆貝爾納.阿爾諾,已利用他與特朗普的關係,使法國奢侈品免於遭受特朗普誇張的海關稅。『經濟學人』發表的那篇馬克龍的訪談,他在其中聲明北大西洋公約組織已經腦死亡,表面上看似乎是反特朗普的一種反應。事實上,這衹是法國數不清的企圖中的一個,趁著美國空虛之機,開創一個強大的歐洲防務。實質上這樣做完全有理由,但遭到德國的拒絕,馬克龍的舉動已經開始滑陷,特朗普主義同樣會殘忍地透視出法國的虛榮。

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Trump Is Beijing’s Best Asset

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/1 ... beijing-best-asset/

Among the many themes of Donald Trump’s presidency, his contentious policies toward China stick out. U.S. foreign-policy experts have noted that Trump’s almost three years in office have witnessed the long-held bipartisan consensus on China shift further and faster than in any other period in history, leading to a rapid and dramatic deterioration of one of the world’s most consequential bilateral relationships.

Though there’s broad political agreement on the need for the United States to take a tougher line on China, the administration’s mercurial approach has led to criticism from Republicans and Democrats alike. Trump has prosecuted a costly trade war against Beijing, banned Huawei’s technology from U.S. 5G networks, and recently placed visa restrictions on Chinese Communist Party officials involved in the extrajudicial incarceration of millions of Muslims in Xinjiang. He has marketed himself as the first U.S. president who is willing to get tough on China.

But for China, Trump’s weaknesses are more important than his bluster. During numerous off the record discussions with Chinese government officials and scholars, we are finding that an increasing number are hoping for Trump’s reelection next year. At a time when China’s political influence and military capabilities are growing, they argue that in spite of his anti-China bluster, Trump has afforded Beijing the space to expand its influence across Asia and, more importantly, comprehensively weakened Washington’s global leadership. From a zero-sum standpoint, many Chinese have concluded that Trump’s policies are strategically very good for China in the long run.

These thinkers believe that Trump, by polarizing U.S. domestic politics, damaging Washington’s international credibility and traditional global stewardship, and undermining long-standing alliance arrangements, has presented Beijing with its “greatest strategic opportunity since the end of the Cold War,” as Yan Xuetong, one of China’s foremost strategic thinkers, put it.

These Chinese thinkers see Trump as a dog with a big bark but little bite. He tested Beijing’s patience by accepting a phone call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen, in what the Chinese viewed as a violation of the “One China” policy, shortly after his election in 2016. Trump publicly questioned whether he would stick with the policy before saying he would, but he also said he would have to check with Chinese President Xi Jinping before taking another call with Tsai. Though the administration has greenlighted some arms sales to Taiwan, whether Trump would back Taipei were Beijing to attack remains doubtful, especially given his mercenary attitude toward U.S. military power.

Beijing has already gained significantly from Trump’s term in office. Despite prosecuting trade spats with India and the European Union, as well as China, the administration has largely given up on using World Trade Organization courts to litigate trade complaints and has blocked appointments to the organization’s Appellate Body. These actions not only get in the way of the world’s most important trade dispute settlement system but also embolden other countries to ignore international law.

When not damaging global governance institutions and mechanisms that helped establish the United States as the world’s preeminent superpower, Trump’s antipathy toward trade deals such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership has afforded China an opening. While Trump is shredding the cooperative trade agreements that have been central to U.S. international economic policy, Beijing is in the late stages of negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a deal that would tie China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations members into the world’s largest trade bloc. If that agreement is ratified, the United States will be left out of the two largest global free trade deals, the other being the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, negotiated among 11 countries involved in the original Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. This would add insult to injury, as China already trades more with every major Asian economy than the United States does.

These relinquishments of U.S. leadership in multilateral institutions provide China the space to take a greater role in global governance and in setting international rules and norms. Beijing has taken notice, asserting itself at the United Nations and submitting trade war-related complaints to the WTO, while promoting the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as a viable alternative to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Though Beijing has moved to make the Belt and Road Initiative the unparalleled vanguard project of global infrastructure development, the Trump administration has yet to provide a viable alternative.

Previous U.S. presidents have recognized that the United States gains strength from working with partners with which it shares values, history, and a sense of purpose. This is no more true than in its approach to the Asia-Pacific, and as Michael Green, a former senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council under President George W. Bush, recently said in testimony before Congress, “without allies, we have no China strategy.

But Trump has taken a starkly different approach, and his rhetoric, actions, and decisions have led countries to question whether they can count on the United States. Trump’s has abandoned the Kurds, longtime partners in the Middle East; questioned America’s commitment to NATO; and let the U.S. post-World War II East Asian alliance network decay.

As China expands its reach, South Korea and Japan, U.S. allies that have formed the backbone of the U.S. military’s Northeast Asia security strategy for over 70 years, are locked in a bitter dispute that has led them to partially suspend their trade relationship. The Trump administration has largely ignored the dispute, displaying little understanding of the importance of these regional partners. Notwithstanding its long history of disagreements with both Tokyo and Seoul, Beijing has now stepped forward and offered to assist in settling the dispute, highlighting the absence of U.S. leadership on the issue.

The Trump administration’s lack of diplomatic skill is also evident in Southeast Asia, as the Philippines, a U.S. ally, has drifted toward Beijing in recent years. Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte has made five trips to China and none to the United States since assuming office in 2016. In an all-too-apt display of Duterte’s strategic alignment, the Philippines used Chinese money to build a new city on land that had once been part of Clark Air Base, a U.S. military installation established during the Spanish-American War. These developments come while Beijing continues to ignore a U.N. ruling in favor of the Philippines in a South China Sea dispute, showing just how much Washington’s relationship with Manila has regressed.

As for the trade war, the much-hyped mini-deal, which included agreements on purchases of agricultural goods and the elimination of future tariffs, fell well short of Trump’s original goal of forcing Beijing to adopt critically important structural economic reforms that would help establish a balanced trade relationship with China over the long term.

Instead of rolling back Chinese subsidies and improving intellectual property protections, the deal mostly helps Trump relieve political pressure in agricultural states as he heads into the presidential campaign. This is part of a pattern where Trump sets high objectives, boasts he will achieve them, and then fails to deliver. The mini-deal was clearly welcomed in China, viewed as a victory for Xi, and provided further evidence that Trump’s capricious behavior can be tolerated, if not managed. The Chinese will see Trump’s acceptance of the watered-down deal, made up mostly of Chinese purchases that have been on the table for more than a year, as a sign of weakness as he faces possible impeachment and another grueling campaign.

Though the Chinese leadership certainly finds Trump to be personally annoying, that he largely views U.S.-China ties through the lens of trade has, according to several of the scholars we spoke with, limited further deterioration of the relationship. Trump has pushed back against his advisors’ more provocative and aggressive policy proposals while watering down others, such as the recent Xinjiang sanctions, which many members of Congress wanted to include Global Magnitsky Act provisions. In contrast, several Democratic presidential candidates, most notably Elizabeth Warren, have called for a tougher line on many China-related issues, including Hong Kong and human rights.

A different U.S. president could, and likely would, take a tougher tack on human rights and use the vast resources of all departments and agencies of the U.S. government to operationalize and execute a new and updated approach to China. Meanwhile, as the bilateral relationship becomes more contentious, many Chinese think that four more years of Trump weakening the United States’ international standing could yield Beijing the space to consolidate its global gains and welcome a new American president in 2025 from an even more favorable strategic position.

To be clear, not every Chinese scholar or official with whom we talked wanted to see another four years of Trump. Some, such as the University of International Relations professor Da Wei, have argued that Trump’s damaging of both Chinese and U.S. interests could result in a deeply compromised international order and complicate Beijing’s continued rise.

But those who hope for a second term see an unprecedented strategic opportunity for China in Trump’s destruction of what they view as the key U.S. pillars of strength. By gutting U.S. political advantages at home, eviscerating America’s reputation and credibility abroad, and subverting the heretofore solid alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific, Trump is weakening the United States. In doing so, he is granting China the opportunity to gain critical geopolitical advantages and create a more favorable international environment in which to advance its own interests.

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《華盛頓郵報》:特朗普或拒簽《香港人權與民主法案》

https://thestandnews.com/politic ... %E6%B3%95%E6%A1%88/

美國眾議院早前全票通過《香港人權與民主法案》,法案主要推手共和黨參議員魯比奧(Marco Rubio)上周四(14日)啟動「熱線」程序,若無參議員反對,他指可於最快當地時間本周一(18日)通過,毋須全院表決,隨後提交總統特朗普簽署。不過 《華盛頓郵報》報道,白宮可能關心中美貿易協議多過香港情況,特朗普或許最終會拒絕簽署法案。

《華盛頓郵報》報道,參眾兩院即使通過法案,仍需要克服另一重障礙,就是白宮可能重視中美貿易協定,多於香港的情況。上周香港示威有加劇跡象,部份大學校園成為示威者和警方衝突的「戰場」,問題是特朗普會否堅定地捍衞香港,經常在 Twitter 發文評論的特朗普,至今未有就法案作任何評論。

麥高文: 特朗普的沉默令人不安

美國國會及行政當局中國委員會(CECC)主席、眾議員麥高文(Jim McGovern)認為特朗普的沉默令人感到不安,他指美國當然希望想與中方建立良好的經濟關係,但並不代表要犧牲對人權的承諾。

報道指,特朗普要爭取 2020 年連任,與中方達成貿易協議自然是優先工作。美國戰略暨國際研究中心中國問題專家布蘭切特(Jude Blanchette)指,法案一旦通過,勢必激起北京怒火,將難以與美方簽訂協議。不過,法案獲民主共和兩黨大力支持,加上 NBA 風波提高了全美民眾對香港局勢的關注,特朗普要拒簽有難度。白宮拒絕評論該法案。

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川普意圖阻延《香港人權與民主法案》

【新聞來源】:
https://www.voachinese.com/a/Tru ... 191122/5177247.html

https://twitter.com/austinramzy/status/1197881108953612289

https://www.washingtonpost.com/b ... -china-trade-talks/

“We have to stand with Hong Kong, but I’m also standing with President Xi [Jinping],” Trump said. “He’s a friend of mine. He’s an incredible guy. ... But I’d like to see them work it out. Okay? We have to see and work it out. But I stand with Hong Kong. I stand with freedom. I stand with all of the things that we want to do, but we also are in the process of making the largest trade deal in history. And if we could do that, that would be great."

The president also told Fox, without evidence, that he had saved the lives of thousands of Hong Kong demonstrators by telling Xi not to intervene.

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川普阻延《香港人權與民主法案》的狡猾伎倆

11月22日,川普接受 Fox 電視臺訪問時說:「我們必須跟香港站在一起,但我也跟習主席站在一起。」

川普又說:「但是我們也正處在努力達成史上最大的貿易協議的過程之中。」

川普說,「毫無疑問」,這部法案是使貿易談判「變得複雜的因素」。

在此,川普的意思已經很明確:他不打算很快簽署《香港人權與民主法案》,因為怕影響貿易協議。

為免被指責為「見利忘義」、「勾結共匪」,川普又吹噓道:「假如沒有我,香港將會在14分鐘內被毀滅。中國在香港境外陳兵百萬,他們沒進去完全是因為我向他(習近平)提出了請求。」

於是,僅憑一句話,川普便成了香港的「大救星」。港人不僅不能怪責川普拖延簽署《香港人權與民主法案》,還要感謝他的「救命之恩」。

然而眾所周知,川普一向有吹牛、撒謊的習慣,經常被其同僚拆穿。這次川普說的話,會不會被證偽?難說,畢竟當場見證者少。習近平顯然是知情者之一,但習也不可能跳出來公開說:「川普撒謊,他從沒對我說過那樣的話。我沒有讓解放軍直接在香港屠城,是出於我們紅色權貴的策略考慮,不是由於川普阻止。」

事實是,由於香港是國際大都市,有許多外籍人士,共匪如果明目張膽出動解放軍,在香港大屠殺世界各國民眾,分分鐘會引來八國聯軍。

所以,共匪才狡猾地讓解放軍冒充港警,在香港上演「變相戒嚴」、「慢板六四」、「化武屠城」。

共匪的這些做法,是出於其戰略戰術考慮,而不是因為川普阻止。

事實上,把川普推上臺的勢力之一,是共匪紅色權貴血債幫。川普的本意是希望共匪血腥鎮壓香港,早前川普已將香港民主運動稱為「暴亂」(riots),後來由於國會和輿論壓力,川普才假惺惺表態「stand with Hong Kong」。

那麼接下來,川普會用什麼手段阻延《香港人權與民主法案》呢?我們不妨參考一下川普對華為孟晚舟放水的手法:

當初,加拿大剛逮捕了孟晚舟之後,美國必須在規定時間內,向加拿大提出引渡孟晚舟,否則孟晚舟將被釋放。

而就在這關鍵時期,川普借「建牆」之事由,關停了白宮,致使美國差點不能及時提出引渡,差點把孟晚舟放虎歸山。

從中我們可以總結出川普的一些手法:

1)用間接的方法放水。例如,借看似不相關的「建牆」之事由,關停了白宮,差點讓孟晚舟獲釋。

2)不直接拒絕,而是采用「哄騙拖」手法。「哄騙拖」是共匪的慣用手法,廣泛運用於各種國內、國際事務,例如對國內維權上訪民眾、港人民主普選訴求,乃至朝核問題、國際貿易談判等,共匪都熟練運用「哄騙拖」戰術。

3)必要時直接出手,為共匪權貴服務,然後用謊言和詭辯圓場。例如孟晚舟被捕之初,川普曾暗示可能會動用總統權力干預司法、特赦孟晚舟。

由此推測,川普對《香港人權與民主法案》,可能采取如下策略:

1)不直接否決,公開表態支持該法案、支持民主自由等等。

2)雖然公開表態支持,但不簽署法案,一直拖著。

3)在拖的過程中,想辦法讓法案「意外」流產,例如借一些事由關停白宮、關停國會,使法案一拖再拖。

4)實在拖不下去,法案成為法律了,但執行權也完全在於白宮。是否實施制裁、具體制裁哪些官員、制裁到何等程度,完全由白宮決定。在這裏,川普有很大的放水空間。

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港人集會,呼吁美國總統簽署《香港人權與民主法案》


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vRXS-Sw9HFc

【The Wall Street Journal】Trump Calls Hong Kong Protests ‘Complicating Factor’ in Trade Talks

https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi- ... uncture-11574422912

President Trump called antigovernment protests in Hong Kong a “complicating factor” in his bid for an elusive trade deal with China and didn’t say whether he would sign a bill passed by Congress supporting the protesters.

“We have to stand with Hong Kong, but I’m also standing with President Xi,” Mr. Trump said of the Chinese leader in response to a question about the bill. “He’s a friend of mine, he’s an incredible guy.”

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