六四事件. 六四事件相片可能引起不安. June4

六四事件. 六四事件相片可能引起不安. June4 - Printable Version

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回復 1169# Dr.Who 的帖子 - Dr.Who - 06-05-2011

Wikileaks: no bloodshed inside Tiananmen Square, cables claim

Secret cables from the United States embassy in Beijing have shown there was no bloodshed inside Tiananmen Square when China put down student pro-democracy demonstrations 22 years ago.

The cables, obtained by WikiLeaks and released exclusively by The Daily Telegraph, partly confirm the Chinese government's account of the early hours of June 4, 1989, which has always insisted that soldiers did not massacre demonstrators inside Tiananmen Square.

Instead, the cables show that Chinese soldiers opened fire on protesters outside the centre of Beijing, as they fought their way towards the square from the west of the city.

Three cables were sent from the US embassy on June 3, in the hours leading up to the suppression, as diplomats realised that the final showdown between the protesters and soldiers was looming.

The cables described the "10,000 to 15,000 helmeted armed troops" moving into the city, some of whom were "carrying automatic weapons".

Meanwhile, "elite airborne troops" and "tank units" were said to be moving up from the south.

The army came up against "an elaborate system of blockades", described in a cable from May 21, 1989, which allowed students to "control much of central Beijing".

Diplomats observed that "there were buses turned sideways to form roadblocks" and students had vowed the army would not be able to cross. "But we doubt it", one cable added. Students also used teams of motorcycle couriers to communicate with the roadblocks, sending reinforcements where needed.

As the troops moved in, the cables stated that diplomatic staff were repeatedly warned to "stay at home" unless involved in front-line reporting. "The situation in the centre of the city is very confused," said a cable from June 3. "Political officers at the Beijing Hotel reported that troops are pushing a large crowd east on Chang'an avenue. Although these troops appear not to be firing on the crowd, they report firing behind the troops coming from the square".

Inside the square itself, a Chilean diplomat was on hand to give his US counterparts an eyewitness account of the final hours of the pro-democracy movement.

"He watched the military enter the square and did not observe any mass firing of weapons into the crowds, although sporadic gunfire was heard. He said that most of the troops which entered the square were actually armed only with anti-riot gear – truncheons and wooden clubs; they were backed up by armed soldiers," a cable from July 1989 said.

The diplomat, who was positioned next to a Red Cross station inside Tiananmen Square, said a line of troops surrounded him and "panicked" medical staff into fleeing. However, he said that there was "no mass firing into the crowd of students at the monument".

According to internal Communist party files, released in 2001, 2,000 soldiers from the 38th army, together with 42 armoured vehicles, began slowly sweeping across the square from north to south at 4.30am on June 4. At the time, around 3,000 students were sitting around the Monument to the People's Heroes on the southern edge of the giant square, near Chairman Mao's mausoleum.

Leaders of the protest, including Liu Xiaobo, the winner of last year's Nobel Peace prize, urged the students to depart the square, and the Chilean diplomat relayed that "once agreement was reached for the students to withdraw, linking hands to form a column, the students left the square through the south east corner." The testimony contradicts the reports of several journalists who were in Beijing at the time, who described soldiers "charging" into unarmed civilians and suggests the death toll on the night may be far lower than the thousands previously thought.

In 2009, James Miles, who was the BBC correspondent in Beijing at the time, admitted that he had "conveyed the wrong impression" and that "there was no massacre on Tiananmen Square. Protesters who were still in the square when the army reached it were allowed to leave after negotiations with martial law troops [ ...] There was no Tiananmen Square massacre, but there was a Beijing massacre".

Instead, the fiercest fighting took place at Muxidi, around three miles west of the square, where thousands of people had gathered spontaneously on the night of June 3 to halt the advance of the army.

According to the Tiananmen Papers, a collection of internal Communist party files, soldiers started using live ammunition at around 10.30pm, after trying and failing to disperse the crowd with tear gas and rubber bullets. Incredulous, the crowd tried to escape but were hampered by its own roadblocks.

The cables also reveal the extent to which the student democracy protests had won popular support, and how for several weeks the protesters effectively occupied the whole of central Beijing, posing an existential challenge to the Communist party.

One cable, from May 21, 1989, reports that an anonymous caller had told the US consulate in Shenyang that Ni Zhifu, the chairman of China's labour unions, had condemned martial law in the capital and warned that unless the students were treated with more respect he would lead a general workers' strike that would cripple China.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8555142/Wikileaks-no-bloodshed-inside-Tiananmen-Square-cables-claim.html

[ 本帖最後由 Dr.Who 於 2011-6-5 22:41 編輯 ]

回復 1170# Dr.Who 的帖子 - Dr.Who - 06-05-2011

維基解密：扯下中南海驚天黑幕

http://www.forum4hk.com/viewthread.php?tid=14862&extra=page%3D1&page=5

- Dr.Who - 06-05-2011

六四 22年　 15萬人維園悼念
燭光不滅
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/template/apple/art_main.php?iss_id=20110605&sec_id=4104&art_id=15314542

22年前內地遊行　今朝來港訴心聲
「學生的血不會白流」
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/template/apple/art_main.php?iss_id=20110605&sec_id=4104&subsec_id=11866&art_id=15314556

來港求學揭被蒙蔽歷史
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/template/apple/art_main.php?iss_id=20110605&sec_id=4104&subsec_id=11866&art_id=15314557

集會後堅信終有平反一天
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/template/apple/art_main.php?iss_id=20110605&sec_id=4104&subsec_id=11866&art_id=15314559

- Dr.Who - 06-05-2011

網絡時代成長　六四薪火接力
宅男小學生湧入維園
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/template/apple/art_main.php?iss_id=20110605&sec_id=4104&subsec_id=11866&art_id=15314599

論壇籲師生罷課
反抗洗腦教育
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/template/apple/art_main.php?iss_id=20110605&sec_id=4104&subsec_id=11866&art_id=15314601

學生直擊
爆范太真面目
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/template/apple/art_main.php?iss_id=20110605&sec_id=4104&subsec_id=11866&art_id=15314602

- Dr.Who - 06-05-2011

報哀音讓內地人驚悉六四
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/template/apple/art_main.php?iss_id=20110605&sec_id=4104&subsec_id=11866&art_id=15314645

王丹籲關注兩岸人權「人民需要的是尊嚴」
700大學生台北悼六四
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/template/apple/art_main.php?iss_id=20110605&sec_id=4104&subsec_id=11866&art_id=15314708

- Dr.Who - 06-05-2011

美国之音时事大家谈(1/2): 六四22周年VOA专访学运领袖柴玲
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tc4vc8DwHJA
[youtube]Tc4vc8DwHJA[/youtube]

美国之音时事大家谈(2/2): 六四22周年VOA专访学运领袖柴玲
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ub2uhWTWrjk&feature=relmfu
[youtube]Ub2uhWTWrjk&feature=relmfu[/youtube]

回復 1170# Dr.Who 的帖子 - ChowYunFatS - 06-06-2011

原文內容 : 「There was no Tiananmen Square massacre, but there was a Beijing massacre」

英文 = Beijing massacre , 中文 = 北京大屠殺
北京是城市, 六四是中共的行動, 所以「中共屠城」是正確的表達

愛共人士叫人認同此文章, 即係叫人認同「北京大屠殺」和「中共屠城」
愛共人士不敢認同「北京大屠殺」和「中共屠城」, 即不認同此文章!
不過愛共人士不是話不要信西方媒體嗎 ?

- ChowYunFatS - 06-06-2011

隔牆有耳：人仔捐款多咗一倍

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/template/apple/art_main.php?iss_id=20110606&sec_id=4104&subsec_id=15333&art_id=15316345&cat_id=45&coln_id=20

回復 1176# ChowYunFatS 的帖子 - Dr.Who - 06-07-2011

蘇聯檔案解密,六四天安門死3000人
http://www.creaders.net/newsViewer.php?nid=434117&id=987794

注意这一段对话：

Lukyanov reports that the real number of casualties on Tiananmen Square was 3,000.（Lukyanov：天安门的真实死亡数字是3000人）

Gorbachev: We must be realists. They, like us, have to defend themselves. Three thousands . . . So what?（戈尔巴乔夫：我们必须现实。他们和我们一样，必须维护自己。三千。。。那又怎么样？）

这是“六四”屠杀三千人的最新证据。此前有三个证据指向三千人这个数字：

一、六四清晨中国红十字会及某医院发言人分别公布，医院死亡人数 2600-2700；一些西方情报机构的数字更高；

二、北京大学学生自治会和北高联派出28辆校车去几十家医院的调查结果，与红十字会数字吻合；（北大筹委会副主席常劲的见证；北高联秘书长王有才的见证）

三、美国学者Timothy Brook的书中有“六四”当天11家医院的死亡数字，总共478人；据此他推测整个北京124家医院应有2800人死亡，与红十字会和两个学生组织的数字吻合。

四、这些数字仅仅是六四当天在医院调查的，应该还有不少医院外死亡和失踪的情况。如戒严部队冲进医院使很多人避到医院外，因得不到妥善治疗而辞世的；另外，王楠的案例（丁子霖名单第2号）证明还有大量失踪的情况，外界更难以知道。

Timothy Brook的书名是Quelling the People,这是该书第161页的影像：
[Image: 20100607095634.jpg]

http://www.city-journal.org/2010/20_2_soviet-archives.html

Claire Berlinski
A Hidden History of Evil
Why doesn’t anyone care about the unread Soviet archives?
[Image: 20100607095653.jpg]

回復 1178# Dr.Who 的帖子 - Dr.Who - 06-07-2011

Marc Riboud/Magnum Photos
Though Mikhail Gorbachev is lionized in the West, the untranslated archives suggest a much darker figure.
In the world’s collective consciousness, the word “Nazi” is synonymous with evil. It is widely understood that the Nazis’ ideology—nationalism, anti-Semitism, the autarkic ethnic state, the Führer principle—led directly to the furnaces of Auschwitz. It is not nearly as well understood that Communism led just as inexorably, everywhere on the globe where it was applied, to starvation, torture, and slave-labor camps. Nor is it widely acknowledged that Communism was responsible for the deaths of some 150 million human beings during the twentieth century. The world remains inexplicably indifferent and uncurious about the deadliest ideology in history.

For evidence of this indifference, consider the unread Soviet archives. Pavel Stroilov, a Russian exile in London, has on his computer 50,000 unpublished, untranslated, top-secret Kremlin documents, mostly dating from the close of the Cold War. He stole them in 2003 and fled Russia. Within living memory, they would have been worth millions to the CIA; they surely tell a story about Communism and its collapse that the world needs to know. Yet he can’t get anyone to house them in a reputable library, publish them, or fund their translation. In fact, he can’t get anyone to take much interest in them at all.

Then there’s Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, who once spent 12 years in the USSR’s prisons, labor camps, and psikhushkas—political psychiatric hospitals—after being convicted of copying anti-Soviet literature. He, too, possesses a massive collection of stolen and smuggled papers from the archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which, as he writes, “contain the beginnings and the ends of all the tragedies of our bloodstained century.” These documents are available online at bukovsky-archives.net, but most are not translated. They are unorganized; there are no summaries; there is no search or index function. “I offer them free of charge to the most influential newspapers and journals in the world, but nobody wants to print them,” Bukovsky writes. “Editors shrug indifferently: So what? Who cares?”

The originals of most of Stroilov’s documents remain in the Kremlin archives, where, like most of the Soviet Union’s top-secret documents from the post-Stalin era, they remain classified. They include, Stroilov says, transcripts of nearly every conversation between Gorbachev and his foreign counterparts—hundreds of them, a near-complete diplomatic record of the era, available nowhere else. There are notes from the Politburo taken by Georgy Shakhnazarov, an aide of Gorbachev’s, and by Politburo member Vadim Medvedev. There is the diary of Anatoly Chernyaev—Gorbachev’s principal aide and deputy chief of the body formerly known as the Comintern—which dates from 1972 to the collapse of the regime. There are reports, dating from the 1960s, by Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief of the Central Committee’s International Department until 1987 and then Gorbachev’s advisor until 1991. Zagladin was both envoy and spy, charged with gathering secrets, spreading disinformation, and advancing Soviet influence.

When Gorbachev and his aides were ousted from the Kremlin, they took unauthorized copies of these documents with them. The documents were scanned and stored in the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation, one of the first independent think tanks in modern Russia, where a handful of friendly and vetted researchers were given limited access to them. Then, in 1999, the foundation opened a small part of the archive to independent researchers, including Stroilov. The key parts of the collection remained restricted; documents could be copied only with the written permission of the author, and Gorbachev refused to authorize any copies whatsoever. But there was a flaw in the foundation’s security, Stroilov explained to me. When things went wrong with the computers, as often they did, he was able to watch the network administrator typing the password that gave access to the foundation’s network. Slowly and secretly, Stroilov copied the archive and sent it to secure locations around the world.

When I first heard about Stroilov’s documents, I wondered if they were forgeries. But in 2006, having assessed the documents with the cooperation of prominent Soviet dissidents and Cold War spies, British judges concluded that Stroilov was credible and granted his asylum request. The Gorbachev Foundation itself has since acknowledged the documents’ authenticity.

Bukovsky’s story is similar. In 1992, President Boris Yeltsin’s government invited him to testify at the Constitutional Court of Russia in a case concerning the constitutionality of the Communist Party. The Russian State Archives granted Bukovsky access to its documents to prepare his testimony. Using a handheld scanner, he copied thousands of documents and smuggled them to the West.

The Russian state cannot sue Stroilov or Bukovsky for breach of copyright, since the material was created by the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, neither of which now exists. Had he remained in Russia, however, Stroilov believes that he could have been prosecuted for disclosure of state secrets or treason. The military historian Igor Sutyagin is now serving 15 years in a hard-labor camp for the crime of collecting newspaper clippings and other open-source materials and sending them to a British consulting firm. The danger that Stroilov and Bukovsky faced was real and grave; they both assumed, one imagines, that the world would take notice of what they had risked so much to acquire.

Stroilov claims that his documents “tell a completely new story about the end of the Cold War. The ‘commonly accepted’ version of history of that period consists of myths almost entirely. These documents are capable of ruining each of those myths.” Is this so? I couldn’t say. I don’t read Russian. Of Stroilov’s documents, I have seen only the few that have been translated into English. Certainly, they shouldn’t be taken at face value; they were, after all, written by Communists. But the possibility that Stroilov is right should surely compel keen curiosity.

For instance, the documents cast Gorbachev in a far darker light than the one in which he is generally regarded. In one document, he laughs with the Politburo about the USSR’s downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 in 1983—a crime that was not only monstrous but brought the world very near to nuclear Armageddon. These minutes from a Politburo meeting on October 4, 1989, are similarly disturbing:

Lukyanov reports that the real number of casualties on Tiananmen Square was 3,000.

Gorbachev: We must be realists. They, like us, have to defend themselves. Three thousands . . . So what?

And a transcript of Gorbachev’s conversation with Hans-Jochen Vogel, the leader of West Germany’s Social Democratic Party, shows Gorbachev defending Soviet troops’ April 9, 1989, massacre of peaceful protesters in Tbilisi.

Stroilov’s documents also contain transcripts of Gorbachev’s discussions with many Middle Eastern leaders. These suggest interesting connections between Soviet policy and contemporary trends in Russian foreign policy. Here is a fragment from a conversation reported to have taken place with Syrian president Hafez al-Assad on April 28, 1990:

H. ASSAD. To put pressure on Israel, Baghdad would need to get closer to Damascus, because Iraq has no common borders with Israel. . . .

M. S. GORBACHEV. I think so, too. . . .

H. ASSAD. Israel’s approach is different, because the Judaic religion itself states: the land of Israel spreads from Nile to Euphrates and its return is a divine predestination.

M. S. GORBACHEV. But this is racism, combined with Messianism!

H. ASSAD. This is the most dangerous form of racism.

One doesn’t need to be a fantasist to wonder whether these discussions might be relevant to our understanding of contemporary Russian policy in a region of some enduring strategic significance.