CCP coercive diplomacy 中共強制外交, 中國霸權 China's Hegemony

[藍寶石王子]

Methodology
This report draws on English and Chinese open-source information from news articles, policy papers, academic research, company websites, social media posts, official government documents and statements made by politicians and business officials. This report attempted to gather as many examples of coercive diplomacy as could be identified through open-source materials over a 10-year period and the cases underwent external peer review by 27 experts from 16 different countries. However, various limitations in the methodology used and finite human and language resources mean that it’s certainly not exhaustive or comprehensive. The resulting database is a starting point and an indicator of practice rather than a complete record.

Coercive diplomacy, by design, is difficult to measure because it takes various forms, is defined differently across the literature and can represent different levels of state authoritativeness, particularly in cases involving nationalist responses. The underlying data for most of this report relies on direct or implied statements by senior CCP officials and authoritative Chinese state media, non-authoritative Chinese media, and perceptions of coercive diplomacy in foreign media reports (although in some circumstances non-Chinese sources may be restricted or controlled in part by governments to prevent any further deterioration in relations with the Chinese state). Where possible, this report supplements this data with analysis from academic sources and in-country experts during the peer review process. Those sources are used to connect the action that the CCP objects to and the resulting coercive measure, as the CCP doesn’t make the link explicit and tends to deny responsibility.

However, some examples are likely to have been missed in this dataset or incorrectly specified, as cases might be only partially reported, be reported in error or go entirely unreported. This report excluded some acts of coercion, such as coercion against civil society actors and individuals, unless there was a clear link to a state dispute. This report also excluded cases in which the measures were considered a normal or proportionate diplomatic response to state conduct and cases that amounted to ‘tit-for-tat’ measures. For example, coercive acts related to the US–China trade war and the diplomatic fallout from the India–China border clash aren’t counted in the dataset.

A single incident or dispute can generate multiple instances of coercive diplomacy, which affects the total number of cases recorded in this report. A single dispute might start with a verbal threat and be followed up by a tourist ban and then by some form of trade sanction. Because this report focuses on instances of coercion rather than individual disputes, the methodology used would count that as three different instances of coercion.

Categorising CCP coercion
Coercive diplomacy encompasses a broad range of tactics that can be applied either individually or collectively by the CCP against individual companies and governments. This report divides the methods of CCP coercive diplomacy into eight categories: arbitrary detention or execution, restrictions on official travel, investment restrictions, trade restrictions, tourism restrictions, popular boycotts, pressure on specific companies and state-issued threats.

Arbitrary detention or execution
The CCP has sought to use arbitrary indictments, detainments and executions of foreign nationals for coercive effect against governments ‘that are not willing to fall in line with [the CCP’s] narrative or to cooperate, according to its own terms’.20 Arbitrary detentions and executions often involve the imposition of enforced disappearances, unusual trial delays, harsh punishments, prolonged interrogations and lack of transparency to maximise the effects of coercion.21 The CCP is also known to reinstate Chinese citizenship to detainees to prevent them from being repatriated, placing even further pressure on the governments of their home countries.22

Restrictions on official travel
Restrictions on official travel involve exerting coercive leverage by downgrading bilateral relations, imposing sanctions on travel to China by foreign leaders and state delegations, or refusing to meet with foreign counterparts.23 Examples of restrictions on official travel that have previously been imposed by the CCP include refusals of entry into China and cancellations of high-level visits.24 This often subjects the targeted government to greater political pressure in its own country to repair or reset relations to the CCP’s advantage.

Investment restrictions
China’s emergence as a major global investor has enabled the CCP to impose restrictions on Chinese outbound and inbound investment activities, such as major trade deals, foreign direct investment, infrastructure projects and joint ventures.25 Those investment restrictions can lead to economic consequences unless the target state changes its stance to that demanded by the CCP.26 This method of coercive diplomacy is commonly used against developing countries in conjunction with chequebook diplomacy.

Trade restrictions
The CCP relies heavily on trade restrictions as a means of coercing states. This tactic involves concerted efforts to disrupt trade flows and restrict foreign access to the Chinese market through import and export restrictions.27 The restrictions can be facilitated through the selective use of international regulations, targeted customs inspections, licence denials, tariff increases or unofficial embargoes.28 Chinese authorities often give unrelated administrative or regulatory explanations for such moves, simply denying the punishment motive.

Tourism restrictions
With direct influence over the movements of its own citizens, the CCP has increasingly turned to tourism restrictions to coerce foreign governments. Given the size of China’s tourism market, the effects of Chinese tourism restrictions are often immediate and long-lasting. The CCP has blocked outbound tourism by issuing official travel warnings, suspending package tours organised through state-run travel agencies and banning permits for independent travellers.29 In other instances, the CCP has blocked inbound tourism by suspending visa waivers or limiting access to consular services.30

Popular boycotts
The CCP can retaliate against foreign governments without imposing direct legal or regulatory interventions by encouraging its citizens to engage in nationalistic popular boycott campaigns through state and social media (Figure 3).31 Popular boycotts can be distinguished from pressure on specific companies in that they focus on companies and industries from the target state more broadly as a means of punishing the state and influencing its public opinion. Popular boycotts aren’t always directly orchestrated by Chinese authorities but can still be encouraged through uncontrolled nationalist protests or negative coverage in state media.32 In the words of the Chinese Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, ‘Chinese people’s anger is not just verbal but will translate into action.’33

The centralisation and comprehensive government control of media in China make it easier for the CCP to mobilise its extensive consumer base and amplify existing boycott campaigns to coerce other countries.34 Pál Nyíri from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam explains that ‘in a country that so tightly controls its online spheres, we can assume some degree of at least tacit support simply by the fact that such actions are allowed to continue on the Chinese web.’35

Figure 3: Chinese demonstrators staging a protest to boycott South Korean conglomerate Lotte Group in March 2017 after the heightening of diplomatic tensions between China, South Korea and the US over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system



Source: AFP, ‘Chinese protest against South Korea’s Lotte’, The Straits Times, 5 March 2017, online.

Pressure on specific companies
Multiple foreign companies have been coerced by Chinese authorities and consumers into issuing public apologies and modifying business operations for supposedly ‘hurting the feelings of Chinese people’.36 Such objectionable actions include ‘mislabelling’ Chinese territories on marketing platforms, supporting pro-democracy movements and making references to politically sensitive issues, even if they weren’t originally targeted at the Chinese market.37 While this method of coercive diplomacy is similar to popular boycotts, the two methods can be distinguished in that individual companies are the target on these occasions, rather than foreign governments, although the effect can be to demonstrate strength to the country where the company is based. This method of coercive diplomacy leads to adverse economic impacts due to losses in sales, popular endorsement, brand reputation or market access to the mainland.38 For this research, cases were limited to those that had a geopolitical angle and were either explicitly encouraged by state media or were likely to have been tacitly supported (although discerning the latter category necessarily involved a degree of subjectivity).

State-issued threats
Chinese diplomats, embassies, and government ministries seek to use coercive diplomacy by releasing official statements threatening foreign governments.39 Most, if not all, such state-issued threats contain vague terminology such as ‘countermeasures’,40 ‘retaliation’,41 ‘inflict pain’,42 and ‘the right to further react’.43 Another source of state-issued threats is state-run media organisations. The Global Times, China Daily, Xinhua News and other outlets are often used as mouthpieces by the CCP to publish warnings through sensationalised English-language commentary aimed at the target state and the international community.44 Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin has implied on numerous occasions that the Global Times reflects the views of Chinese authorities, stating that ‘they can’t speak willfully, but I can’ (Figure 4).45 State-issued threats are often used as a prelude to tougher coercive measures.

Figure 4: Tweets by Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin sharing information about potential countermeasures by the CCP against the US



Key Findings
This research documents 152 instances of CCP coercive diplomacy between 2010 and 2020.

Of those cases, 100 targeted foreign governments (Figure 5), while the other 52 cases targeted foreign companies. Those two categories are analysed separately in this report.

Figure 5: Cases of coercive diplomacy used by the CCP against foreign governments, by category



The most common methods of coercive diplomacy against foreign governments
From the data gathered for this report, the most prominent and common methods of coercive diplomacy used by the CCP to target foreign governments are; state-issued threats (with 34 cases recorded between 2010 and 2020, over half of which were recorded in 2020 alone), trade restrictions (19 cases recorded) and tourism restrictions (17 cases recorded).

Of the 27 countries affected, Australia was subjected to the highest number of recorded cases (17 cases), followed by Canada (10 cases) and the United States (9 cases).

Geopolitical trends
The regions that recorded the most instances of coercive diplomacy were Europe; North America; Australia and New Zealand; and East Asia (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan), while countries in Africa, South America, the Pacific islands and the remaining parts of Asia recorded the smallest number of cases (Figure 6). There were no recorded cases of coercive diplomacy in Central America, Central Asia, and Russia during the relevant period. This divide bears many similarities to the divide between high-income and middle/low-income countries, as defined by the World Bank.46

Figure 6: Cases of coercive diplomacy, by region


The most likely reason for this is that the political backers of the CCP are predominantly in the developing world. The CCP has had no reason to subject those countries to coercive diplomatic measures in the past 10 years. The CCP maintains a non-alliance policy, and its supporters aren’t a formal block.47 However, the recent opposing joint statements to the UN on the CCP’s treatment of Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang provide a good demonstration of current affiliations.

As demonstrated in Figures 7 and 8, there’s no overlap between countries subjected to coercive diplomacy by the CCP and those supportive of the CCP’s persecution of minorities, with the exception of the Philippines. The CCP’s use of coercive diplomacy against the Philippines arose mainly from disputes over the South China Sea. However, since President Rodrigo Duterte publicly announced a foreign policy shift to China in 2016, no further coercive diplomacy cases against the Philippines have been recorded.48

Figure 7: Countries that have recorded cases of coercive diplomacy by the CCP between 2010 and 2020


Figure 8: Countries by their stance on the CCP’s treatment of Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang